University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2007

Deconstructing Duff and Phelps
M. Todd Henderson
dangelolawlib+mtoddhenderson@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
M. Todd Henderson, "Deconstructing Duff and Phelps" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 338, 2007).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 338
(2D SERIES)

Deconstructing Duff & Phelps
M. Todd Henderson

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
March 2007
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=977276

Deconstructing Duff & Phelps
M. Todd Henderson‡

In his dissent in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps Judge Posner, who this year is celebrating
his 25th anniversary on the bench, showed why he is regarded as among the keenest of
our federal judges. This article shows why Posner gets the better of the arguments in this
classic corporate law chestnut taught in most law school corporate law classes. In
addition, it offers some new perspectives on Duff & Phelps in light of the developments
in case law and corporate and securities practice in the decades since the opinion was
written.
First, it sets forth a new theory about the interplay between tag-along rights
and disclosure. The employee in this case, Jordan, didn’t bargain for “tag-along” rights
(commonly negotiated elements of shareholder agreements in closely held firms that
allow minority shareholders to share control premia) when he bought his shares in Duff
& Phelps, but the court allows him to recover as if he did. This paper shows why courts
should be reluctant to give sophisticated and informed parties, like Jordan, that actually
dicker over terms, rights they didn’t want to pay for. The implication of Jordan’s refusal
to bargain for these rights, and therefore the majority’s ability to keep the control
premium for itself, goes to disclosure: the more likely it is that the firm can exclude
Jordan from participating in any change-of-control premium, the less valuable any
disclosure of inchoate merger plans would be to him. The court’s conclusion that
disclosure was valuable to Jordan is undermined by the fact that nothing in law or fact
suggested that Jordan had a right to share in the spoils of the merger.
Second, the paper shows why the structure of the shareholder agreement
Jordan signed amounted to a waiver of his rights to bring the suit he filed and won.
Jordan effectively consented to being traded against by those with inside information
(that is, the firm). By agreeing when he bought the shares to take book value for them at
some time in the future, Jordan was in effect consenting to trades with the firm at a set
price in cases in which one or both parties would know that the fair value of the shares
deviated from book value. This looks like the modern “big boy” letter, which provides a
basis for much over-the-counter securities practice: two sophisticated parties on opposite
sides of a securities deal agree to not bring securities fraud claims in the future based on
the fact that they are “big boys” and know the other might have inside information. Big
boy letters are widely used and are being accepted by courts as de facto waivers of certain
securities law claims; a recent development that Posner implicitly suggests in his dissent.
Finally, the paper shows why applying theories of insider trading in cases
involving options at the time of the exercise of the option is inappropriate. Although a
party to an option contract—Jordan effectively sold a call and bought a put—may be
engaged in insider trading at the time the derivative contract is executed, finding liability
for asymmetric information at the time of exercise defeats the entire justification for
entering into the contract in the first place. The Duff & Phelps rule effectively disables
the options for parties that have information that makes the options valuable in the first
place.

‡

Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Alison LaCroix, Saul
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I. INTRODUCTION
Asked to take stock of Judge Posner’s contribution to the law of business, one
immediately thinks about his contribution to the reconceptualization of antitrust and the
development of law and economics. Asked to write about his most famous corporate law
case, one faces a more difficult task. While Posner undoubtedly has written many learned
and ingenious corporate law opinions, his only canonical opinion is his dissent from
Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion in Jordan v Duff and Phelps, Inc.1
Duff & Phelps considers whether a closely held firm must disclose to an employeeshareholder inchoate merger negotiations before buying shares from that shareholder,
pursuant to an agreement that required the shareholder to sell back shares at a set price
upon leaving the firm. The majority wanted to decide this case on simple grounds by
employing a close-corporation exception from the general rule for publicly traded firms:
that no disclosure is required until the deal is basically done because premature disclosure
might destroy the deal or even prevent it from happening in the first place. The court
concluded that disclosure yields less potential mischief in closely held firms, and that this
militates in favor of earlier disclosure. To get here, however, Posner’s dissent cleverly
forces the majority to find a duty to disclose running from the firm to its employeeshareholder, which leads the court to question employment-at-will and implied duties of
good faith and fair dealing, and how they interact with federal securities laws. The result
is an opinion that fundamentally alters corporate law for the worse.
The legal combat between the two judges, which the third member of the panel calls
“lucid,” “cogent,” and “ingenious,”2 provides not only insight into Judge Posner’s legal
mind, but also fodder for an analysis of the current state of fiduciary duties, insider
trading law, and other corporate law puzzles.
***

1

815 F2d 429, 444–52 (7th Cir 1987) (Posner dissenting). The case is featured in the leading casebook
on corporate law, see William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Business
Associations: Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations 651 (Foundation, 6th ed., 2006) (concluding the
section titled “Abuse of Control”), has been cited well over five hundred times, and is a staple of legal
education.
2
See id at 443 (Cudahy concurring) (agreeing that the “price-and-structure rule” should not apply to
closely held companies, but reserving judgment as to whether it should apply to public companies).
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Before getting to the meat of the case, it is worth pausing momentarily to consider the
peculiarity of this case in Judge Posner’s oeuvre. For one, Posner dissents are rare; he
dissented in only about one percent of the over 7100 cases he has heard since his
appointment in 1981, averaging only four dissents per year.3 Courts of appeals judges
with similar tenure are more than three times as likely to dissent.4 Posner’s low rate
cannot obviously be explained by collegiality or practice on the Seventh Circuit—the
court average is over three percent.5 Perhaps Posner is particularly persuasive on the
judges he sits with, but this is the subject for another essay.
Another reason this case is odd is that a disagreement between judges Posner and
Easterbrook is exceptionally rare: of the over 1400 cases the two have heard together,
they have reached different decisions only about 50 times.6 Disputes are even more rare
when one of the two writes the majority opinion: specifically, Judge Posner has dissented
from a majority opinion written by Judge Easterbrook only about 15 times (out of over
300 cases where Easterbrook wrote the majority); and Judge Easterbrook has dissented
from a majority opinion written by Judge Posner only about 19 times (out of over 380
cases where Posner wrote the majority).7
Posner’s dissent is even more striking since Easterbrook is one of the world’s
foremost corporate law scholars,8 and we might expect deference from nonexpert judges
in such cases. We can guess the reason Posner chose to fight his friend and colleague
(both on the bench and at the University of Chicago Law School) on such sacred ground
by their academic backgrounds and the types of arguments they make. Posner sees the
case as one governed by employment-at-will and contract law; Easterbrook sees the case
as one governed by corporate and federal securities law. This isn’t surprising since these
are their respective academic specialties: Posner’s history as a scholar is primarily

3

All searches used the Westlaw database for the particular circuit court and were conducted February 7,
2007; all search queries were “PANEL(name)” and “DISSENT(name)”, unless otherwise indicated.
4
Among Judge Posner’s peers are Judges Cardamone (2 percent) and Winter (3 percent) (Second
Circuit); Garwood (3 percent) and Higginbotham (2 percent) (Fifth Circuit); Reinhardt (7 percent) and
Pregerson (5 percent) (Ninth Circuit); and Seymour (2 percent) (Tenth Circuit).
5
The average number of dissents for active judges.
6
Search query example: “PANEL(Easterbrook) & DISSENT(Posner) % DISSENT(Easterbrook)”.
7
Search query example: “JUDGE(Easterbrook) & DISSENT(Posner)”.
8
Shortly after Duff & Phelps was decided, Easterbrook coauthored the leading law review article to this
day on close corporations. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, “Close Corporations
and Agency Costs,” 38 Stan L. Rev. 271 (1986).
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focused on the common law, while Easterbrook teaches and writes more narrowly about
corporate and securities laws.9 We might go further and speculate that Posner’s stand
here on common law grounds notwithstanding Easterbrook’s expertise is an attempt to
preserve the force of common law principles and reasoning in the face of an increasingly
specialized and federalized law, but, again, this is for another time.
***
Turning back to the case, the basic facts are as follows: Jordan worked as an
investment analyst with Duff and Phelps (D&P), a small, private Illinois corporation.
Like most closely held corporations, D&P had two key governance characteristics: first,
it paid out almost all of its profits in salary, leaving a very modest dividend; and second,
it combined risk-bearing and management functions in a very small set of individuals.
D&P let some employees invest in firm stock—including Jordan, who by the time he
quit held about 1 percent of the firm’s outstanding equity—but restricted their trading
rights in order to maintain this governance model. The shareholder agreement Jordan
signed did two things: first, it provided that employee-shareholders were subject to the
background at-will employment regime and received no employment rights from holding
shares; and second, it stated that employees who left the firm were required to sell back
shares at their book value measured on a certain date.10
The typical reason firms offer employees equity is to link their fortune to the financial
health of the firm. But for illiquid stocks, a book-value buyout price with no ancillary
employment rights attached is a weak mechanism to do this. Book value will
substantially underestimate the fair value of a firm most of the time, and, as discussed
below, there is no guarantee that minority shareholders would be entitled to share in any
control premium paid in the event of a takeover. So although the agreement may have
provided some slight retention and compensation incentive function (according to people

9

Posner’s most famous contribution to academic law is his theory of negligence and his contribution to
the law and economics of torts and other common-law subjects, see generally Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law (Aspen 6th ed. 2003); Easterbrook is the coauthor of the most famous corporate law text,
see generally Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Harvard 1991)and teaches corporate law and advanced regulation of securities.
10
Courts give firms wide latitude in crafting these agreements, even when extreme, since they serve
several functions essential to firm formation and survival. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law at 228–29, 233 (cited in note 9). (“Because the firm’s principal investors also
manage, it is often necessary to restrict the investors’ ability to alienate their shares.”)
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familiar with D&P), the purchase of stock was more akin to a capital contribution than an
investment—it was an obligation, not an opportunity.
The scope of this contract was implicated when Jordan decided to leave the firm for
personal reasons.11 He quit in November 1984, but was allowed to stay until the close of
the year in order to receive the annual adjustment to book value made on December 31.
All that D&P told him before he left was that the firm’s prospects looked good, and that
he should think about sticking around. He didn’t, and in turn received book value, about
$120 per share.
What Jordan didn’t know was that in the months before he quit, D&P was in talks to
sell the firm at a substantial premium over book value to Security Pacific, a publicly
traded firm. Although that deal was dead by the time Jordan quit, other negotiations were
contemplated. Shortly after Jordan quit, D&P publicly announced its sale to a Security
Pacific subsidiary, which if consummated might have made Jordan’s shares worth much
more than he was paid.
When Jordan heard the news, he sued under the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws (section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193412 and the SEC’s
Rule 10b-513), claiming that the firm had a duty to disclose the possibility of a merger
prior to buying his shares. He argued that the firm, as his fiduciary, could not trade
against him with superior information.
As it turns out, the deal with the subsidiary—like the one with the parent—fell
through. Over a year after Jordan quit, however, D&P ultimately acquired itself in a
management-led buyout. Had Jordan been employed by D&P at this time and had the
deal been structured as it was, Jordan’s shares would have been valued at about $2000
per share.

11

See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 432.
15 USC § 78j(b) (2000) (“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.”).
13
17 CFR 240.10b-5(b) (1951) (“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.”).
12
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II. DUFF & PHELPS AND THE CASE LAW
Based on the briefs, the parties thought the issue in the case was when firms have to
disclose merger negotiations to shareholders of close corporations. The rule for public
companies—the so-called price-and-structure rule—recognizes that disclosing too early
might scare off potential buyers, and therefore disclosure is not required since all
shareholders are better off ex ante under a rule of nondisclosure until the terms of the deal
are finalized.14 Since an agreement in principle wasn’t reached until several months after
Jordan quit, D&P argued that disclosure was unnecessary. Jordan’s case presented a
variation on this rule, however, since one of the two firms involved, D&P, was a private
firm. The risk of letting the cat of the bag might be smaller in this case, and therefore a
more liberal disclosure regime might be tolerable.
Quite to the parties’ surprise, the case turned instead on whether or not D&P could
fire Jordan. Posner, who pushed the court in this direction, argued that since Jordan was
employed at will, the firm could fire him at any time for any reason, including to make
more profit for the firm or certain shareholders from the merger, and therefore disclosing
to him the existence of a potential merger was pointless. In other words, disclosure
requirements presume the recipient can use the information, and since Jordan couldn’t
necessarily use it because he could be fired before acting on it, D&P had no duty to
disclose it.15 Easterbrook’s only response was that if the firm followed this course it
would be acting opportunistically in a way that would violate its duty of good faith and
fair dealing toward its employee-shareholder.16
Easterbrook is correct that even when public policy concerns are not implicated, there
are certain instances when firing an employee is a violation of the most laissez-faire atwill regime. The classic case is a salesman who has earned a commission but is fired
before he can collect. The commission is payment for past performance, and courts imply
a term of good faith and fair dealing in the parties’ employment contract if those terms
aren’t spelled out.

14

See Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F2d 1185, 1195-6 (7th Cir 1987) (noting that although the rule did not
apply under the particular facts of the case, that it is the prevailing rule for merger disclosures).
15
See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 447 (Posner dissenting).
16
Id at 438-9.
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The standard explanation for this rule is that courts are confident that the parties
would have agreed to this bargain had they actually sat down and dickered over this
possibility, and the gap-filling can reduce overall transaction costs. In other words, no
salesman would agree to work on commission knowing that the firm could willy-nilly
take the profits for itself, so courts can provide the efficient contract to all parties at lower
overall cost.
This conclusion is not obvious. For example, one might argue, contra the rule, that it
would be reasonable for the salesman to rely on the reputation of the employer and on his
value to the firm as a deterrent to such opportunism. Moreover, it may serve as a weapon
for poor salesmen (or salesmen who have pushed through questionable deals) to obtain
leverage over an employer about to fire them. Therefore, a better defense of the rule
might be that not paying is conduct that is in direct contravention of the purpose of the
contract: commissions are designed to motivate employees, and a rule allowing
nonpayment is perverse because “the better the performance by the employee, the greater
the temptation to terminate.”17
At first blush, the analogy to this line of cases seems inapposite since Jordan’s shares
don’t look like unpaid sales commissions but rather stock options. The typical options
case involves an employee who is terminated prior to full vesting of his shares, meaning
that he can’t capitalize on their rise in value. Courts hold that unvested shares are, unlike
commissions, not “earned” until vested, and therefore firms can make employment
decisions, even ones that make the firm or other shareholders better off at the expense of
the employee, irrespective of any shareholding rights.18 The cases are short on reasoning,
but we can see how the purpose of the vesting schedule—to induce the employee to
stay—is not fundamentally frustrated by a policy allowing the firm to buy back unvested
shares from employees whom it doesn’t want to stay.
Duff & Phelps looks similar to the vesting cases. The book-value algorithm for
valuation, like the vesting schedule, encouraged Jordan to perform and to stay, since he
17

Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc, 769 F2d 109, 111–13 (2d Cir 1985) (holding that a firm cannot
“terminate an employee for the purpose of avoiding the payment of commissions which are otherwise
owed”).
18
See Harrison v. NetCentric Corp, 433 Mass 465, 744 NE2d 622, 630 (2001) (“[Plaintiff’s] shares
vested over time only if he continued to be employed; thus, the unvested shares are not earned
compensation for past services, but compensation contingent on his continued employment.”)

7

would get a nominal return if he was fired or quit. Unlike the sales commission cases, this
purpose is not frustrated by the firm’s option to fire bad employees.
One difference between the vesting cases and Duff & Phelps is that Jordan’s shares
did not get more valuable simply from the passage of time—it was as if they were
unvested and the vesting schedule was at the discretion of the firm. If this
characterization is fair, we might have reason to doubt that Jordan would ever agree to
such seemingly one-sided terms. But Jordan’s contract served other purposes too. First, it
minimized the parties’ expected ex ante contracting costs, since it eliminated, or so they
thought, the involvement of courts in the process of determining how much shares were
worth in the event of a departure. Many courts find this is a sufficient ground for
upholding contracts even in cases with obvious opportunism and egregious facts.19
Second, D&P viewed the purchase of shares as a capital contribution instead of an
investment opportunity, making the buyback provision a form of insurance on Jordan’s
contribution.20 Finally, as Posner points out, the contract did leave open the possibility
that Jordan would profit from a rise in firm value, for example, if he stayed or was
valuable enough for the firm to keep him around, and at some point a situation presented
itself whereby someone would buy the shares for more than book value.21 Jordan thus
would be relying on his own value and the firm’s reputation to prevent opportunism.
None of these were purposes that would be frustrated by the firm’s “opportunism” in
Jordan’s case. We can’t know the relative weight of these factors in the parties’ bargain,
but the complicated mix gives us reason to doubt the court’s ability to fashion a better
bargain than the parties’ explicit one.22
We could stop here: Jordan’s shares look more like unvested stock options than an
unpaid commission, and so as a doctrinal matter the implied good faith analysis of the
19

See, for example, Gallagher v. Lambert, 74 NY2d 562, 549 NE2d 136, 137 (1989) (“Plaintiff got what
he bargained for—book value for his minority shares . . . . [There is] no basis presented . . . to interfere with
the operation and consequences of this agreement between the parties.”).
20
There was, after all, some chance that the market value of the firm’s shares might be less than book
value when Jordan left the firm. Although unlikely, this buyout formula would protect Jordan from losing
his capital contribution in the event the firm fell on very hard times.
21
Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 448 (Posner dissenting) (arguing that “Jordan was protected by Duff and
Phelps’ own self-interest from being exploited,” because the firm’s “principal asset” was “good will” and
that Jordan “gambled that he was and would continue to be such a good employee that he would be
encouraged to stay long enough to profit from the firm's growth”).
22
Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 448 (Posner dissenting) (“The relationship that the parties created aligned
their respective self-interests better than the legal protections that the court devises today.”).
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majority is misplaced. So where did the court get its reasoning? Like most bad law, it got
its start innocently enough in a tough case that morphed through misinterpretation and
overextension into a general rule unjustified by the reasoning of the case on which it was
based. It starts with a case called Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc,23 which
Easterbrook cites approvingly.24
In Wilkes, four people formed a corporation to own and operate a nursing home. Each
owned equal shares, worked at the facility, and drew salaries instead of dividends. None
of them had employment contracts or shareholding agreements. Given the potential for
conflict and deadlock, this was not smart business planning. In fact, after a dispute, three
decided to oust the fourth by denying him a salary (which was really disguised
dividends), not reelecting him as a director, and buying out his shares at a very low price.
Analogizing to partnership law, notwithstanding the fact that the parties chose the
corporate form, the court invented an intermediate level of fiduciary duty for close
corporations,25 and held that the firing was a breach owed by the three to the fourth.
The outcome in Wilkes is sensible, in that the parties’ implicit bargain—to take
salaries for menial jobs instead of dividends to reduce tax liabilities—was clearly
frustrated by the squeeze out, and the court could therefore be confident that the parties
would have agreed ex ante to prevent such opportunism had they negotiated over this
possibility. Unfortunately, the court’s approach to get to the right result muddled the law
by creating a new class of duties that have been expanded to situations far beyond the
facts of Wilkes.
For example, to the Duff & Phelps court, this case stands for the general proposition
that majority shareholders owe minority shareholders the utmost duty of good faith,
meaning they can’t fire them in order to deny them profits from a potential rise in the
value of their shares. Whether or not we think Wilkes was rightly decided—and there are
strong grounds to think that the creation of “hybrid” duties is terrible public policy26—
23

370 Mass 842, 353 NE2d 657 (1976).
See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 438 (“[N]o one, not even Professor Epstein, doubts that an avowedly
opportunistic discharge is a breach of contract, although the employment is at-will.”).
25
See Wilkes, 353 NE2d at 663 (requiring careful inquiry into whether the “controlling group can
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose” when “minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit
against the majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to them by the majority.”).
26
Making corporations look more like partnerships reduces the contracting space of parties and the
clarity of choice of business forms. This raises overall transaction costs for promoters.
24

9

there are good reasons to doubt the analogy from Wilkes to Duff & Phelps, as will be
evident when we examine Wilkes’s progeny.
As a doctrinal matter, Wilkes’s hybridization of forms and duties is rejected by many
courts. Delaware, for one, rejects Wilkes on the theory that a default rule encouraging
potential investors to negotiate for specific terms will lead to lower overall contracting
costs when including court decision and error costs.27 This supposition is supported by
the evidence in Duff & Phelps. The facts that led to Duff & Phelps spawned numerous
other cases, as a variety of disgruntled former employees sued under similar theories. For
example, an employee given a choice by D&P to keep his job or be fired for running a
competitor business from his D&P desk sued on the ground that had he known about the
merger possibility he would have chosen D&P over his illicit start up.28
In this vein, an alternative holding could have relied on the voluntariness of Jordan’s
“investment” and Delaware’s forcing rule to give Jordan only what he bargained for: atwill employment and book value upon leaving, short of active fraud on the part of D&P.
This would be based on the theory that Jordan could have bargained for disclosure or
other specific informational rights before his sale, and the court should not give him these
rights for free.29 Perhaps Jordan didn’t negotiate for these rights because they are
valuable and he would have had to make other tradeoffs (such as a reduced salary) that he
was unwilling to make. Or perhaps, as the fact that every shareholder signed the same

27

Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A2d 1366, 1379 (Del 1993) (en banc) (holding that preferring employeeshareholders over nonemployee-shareholders does not violate any implicit duties).
28
See Guy v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 672 F Supp 1086, 1090–91 (ND Ill 1987). Other cases involved age
discrimination claims and wrongful termination claims morphing into federal securities fraud cases. See,
for example, Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 5 F3d 488, 490, 493 (11th Cir 1993) (requiring a jury trial on
the issue of when the deceased plaintiff should have learned of D&P’s alleged fraud when the plaintiff
claimed that “the company had coerced him into retirement by misrepresenting the company’s mandatory
retirement age . . . to increase the per share profits of the remaining shareholders”); McLaury v. Duff and
Phelps, Inc., 691 F Supp 1090, 1095 (ND Ill 1988) (denying summary judgment of claims similar to
Jordan’s and a federal age discrimination claim because, among other things, “the clearance of the check
Duff and Phelps used to pay him for his stock” satisfied the “instrumentality of interstate commerce”
jurisdictional requirement in 15 USC § 78j(b); although McLaury’s check never left Illinois, the checkclearing system is integrated into the national banking system).
29
In the typical disclosure case—say, whether a homeowner should disclose something to a buyer—the
parties are bargaining at arm’s length. In this case, the parties had a preexisting contractual relationship,
which militated in favor of requiring the parties to bargain about the obviously foreseeable possibility of
the firm’s value differing from book value.
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contract suggests, Jordan lacked any bargaining power on this issue, and therefore court
gap-filling in his favor was unwarranted.30
It is doubtful that Jordan failed to negotiate because he was unsophisticated or
couldn’t imagine a scenario where he would want such rights—he was an investment
analyst, after all. In the general case, there is reason to believe that investors in close
corporations—especially insiders like Jordan—need less protection than public
shareholders do when it comes to bargaining or antifraud laws. Bargaining for public
shareholders is more costly. They suffer from collective action and free-rider problems,
higher informational costs, and other maladies, and have lower incentives to bargain in
the first place.31
The willingness of courts to look past the plight of sympathetic minority shareholders
and enforce only the four corners of their shareholding contracts reached its apogee in
Gallagher v. Lambert,32 which, had it been an Illinois precedent at the time of Duff &
Phelps, may have been dispositive.33 An employee of a closely held firm entered into an
employment agreement, which replicated an at-will default regime, and a buy-sell
agreement, which provided that for the first three years of his employment (until January
31, 1985), his shares would have to be sold back at book value, and after that date, would
be valued under a buyback formula that would have increased his buyout price from
about $90,000 to over $3 million. It isn’t difficult to see where this is going: on January
10, 1985, just three weeks shy of pay dirt, the firm fired him and claimed that it only had
to pay the pre-January 31 price for the shares. The New York Court of Appeals agreed,
holding that the plain language of the parties’ agreement defined the fruits to which the
employee was entitled.34 The policy purpose for this somewhat incredible result is

30

For a theory on why contracting parties without bargaining power should not be bailed out by courts in
gap-filling cases, see Omri Ben-Shahar [Work in progress paper, on file with author].
31
See Easterbrook and Fischel, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 277–79 (cited in note 8) (describing the different
monitoring needs of publicly and closely held corporations as a result of their different distributions of
management and risk-bearing).
32
74 NY2d 562, 549 NE2d 136 (1989).
33
See id at 138 (“There being no dispute that the employer had the unfettered discretion to fire plaintiff
at any time, we should not redefine the precise measuring device and scope of the agreement.”).
34
See id at 567.
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certainty—the parties provided a formula to value the shares at all future times, and to
disrupt this is to increase contracting costs for all parties.35
The case looks remarkably similar to Duff & Phelps: the firm in Gallagher did
precisely what Posner said D&P could do, and what Easterbrook admits would, if true,
win the day for D&P. Gallagher reiterates the growing consensus of important business
courts in New York and Delaware—and even the Massachusetts courts that started this
mess innocently enough in Wilkes—that minority shareholders in close corporations who
sign bad deals won’t be bailed out by the courts.36 Here again, the policy rationale is that
these investors have the incentives and the power to bargain on their own, and therefore
need less protection than minority shareholders in public firms.
Posner, seeing the intuition years before the cases bear it out, makes this argument to
a certain degree, noting that Jordan’s stockholder agreement, coupled with the at-will
contract provided by the State of Illinois, created an arrangement (what Posner calls
“shareholder at will”) that “is incompatible with an inference that Duff and Phelps
undertook to keep him abreast of developments affecting the value of the firm.”37
Easterbrook parries weakly, acknowledging that “parties may contract with greater
specificity for . . . arrangements” other than the implied fiduciary duties the court
imposes, but emphasizing that in this case “Jordan was an employee at will; he signed no
contract.”38
While true, it is hard to see why this matters. Posner rightly points out that Jordan did
sign a stockholder agreement, which explicitly gave him no employment rights. Perhaps
more fundamentally, it is unclear why it should matter whether Jordan and D&P signed
an employment contract or merely availed themselves of the default contract provided by
35

See id (“[P]arties contract between themselves in advance so that there may be reliance, predictability,
and definitiveness between themselves on such matters.”)[20 words. MW.].
36
See, for example, Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, PC, 420 Mass 404, 649 NE2d 1102, 1105 (1995)
(finding, where an employee-shareholder with an employment contract that mimicked an at-will regime
was bought out at a contract price far below market value, that “questions of good faith and loyalty . . . do
not arise when all the stockholders in advance enter into agreements concerning termination of employment
and for the purchase of stock of a withdrawing . . . stockholder” despite a fiduciary duty “of the utmost
good faith and loyalty” among stockholders in a close corporation).
37
Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 447 (Posner dissenting) (asserting that the stockholder agreement Jordan
signed permissibly defined his rights as a shareholder with greater specificity than the “off-the-rack”
fiduciary duty otherwise would).
38
Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 436 (“It is a violation of duty to steal from the corporate treasury; it is not a
violation to write oneself a check that the board has approved as a bonus.”).
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state law. If all that killed an employee’s similar claim in a Massachusetts case decided
years after Wilkes was that he signed an employment contract that provided that he was to
be employed “until either party shall have given written notice to the other that he (it)
wishes to terminate the contract,”39 a written contract seems like a flimsy basis for
distinguishing Jordan’s case.
Wilkes can also be distinguished on two other grounds. First, the four cofounders in
Wilkes entered into no contracts relevant to how disputes would be handled, so it is
reasonable for courts to apply standard gap-filling analysis—deciding the terms the
parties would have agreed to had they bargained. Since it is likely that four individuals
starting a firm together on equal terms and with equal investments would want to protect
against precisely the type of behavior that occurred in that case, courts are not out of
bounds in implying such obligations on coventurers. In Duff & Phelps, by contrast, the
parties explicitly bargained about certain terms to cover potential eventualities like those
that came to pass. While willing to bail out the undercontracted, courts are rightfully
reluctant to intervene in cases where the parties entered into contracts touching on the
specific issues presented in the case.
Second, Wilkes involved significantly greater stakes from the standpoint of individual
and societal welfare. A conflict among firm founders goes to not only the willingness of
promoters to make large investments of capital (human and otherwise), but also the
livelihood and financial security of the founders. In Jordan’s case, by contrast, the issue
was not about general rules of business formation or his ability to make a living, but was
merely a question of whether his contribution to the firm would return a reasonable
amount or an unbelievable amount. The law, especially the costly judicial system, should
be more aggressive in protecting the fairness of transactions that implicate business
formation and individual high stakes, as opposed to those that we can safely assume will
be adequately policed by market forces. Posner’s way of saying this is, in classic style,
much pithier and wittier than we mortals can match: the court disrupts the corporate law,

39

Blank, 649 NE2d at 1104 (defining the terms of the employment contract referred to in note 36). See
also Riblet Products Corp v. Nagy, 683 A2d 37, 37 (Del 1996) (“[A]lthough majority stockholders have
fiduciary duties to minority stockholders qua stockholders, those duties are not implicated when the issue
involves the rights of the minority stockholder qua employee under an employment contract.”).
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he writes, over concern with “the possibility that corporations will exploit their junior
executives, which may well be the least urgent problem facing our nation.”40

III. DUFF & PHELPS AND OTHER LAW
There are several alternative grounds on which the result in Duff & Phelps can be
criticized, some of which Posner suggests and some left unanalyzed.

A. Did Jordan Have Tag-along Rights?
The court’s holding rests on the assumption that Jordan, if he stayed with the firm
until the merger was consummated, would have received a pro rata distribution of the
merger proceeds. Easterbrook writes matter-of-factly that “[i]f Jordan had been an
employee on [the day the merger was announced], he would have received $452,000 in
cash.”41 This is not necessarily true. The controlling shareholders of D&P could have
arranged a “sale” to an acquirer in several ways that would not share the spoils with
Jordan or other minority shareholders. For example, the acquiring firm could buy a
control stake in D&P, say 51 percent of the shares, at a price that included a control
premium, while maintaining minority shareholders under the terms of their original
stockholder agreements.
There is no duty for the majority to share this premium with the minority: there are no
rules of pro rata distribution of profits to nonselling shareholders;42 there is no “all
holders” rule requiring offers to buy stock to be made to every shareholder on a pro rata
basis, as there is regarding tender offers for public companies under the Williams Act;43
and there is no basis for a suit by minority shareholders to seek disgorgement of a control
premium.44 Tag-along rights are valuable and are readily negotiated as part of business

40

Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 449 (Posner dissenting) (lamenting the “inroads that the majority opinion
makes on freedom of contract”).
41
Id at 433.
42
Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 NY2d 684, 397 NE2d 387, 389 (1979) (declining to entitle
minority stockholders to a share of “any premium paid for a controlling interest in the corporation” because
such an entitlement would “require, essentially, that a controlling interest be transferred only by means of
an offer to all stockholders, i.e., a tender offer”).
43
Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
44
In limited circumstances, shareholders can allege “oppression” as a ground for remedies in a very
limited class of cases. See Hollis v. Hill, 232 F3d 460, 465 n 8 (5th Cir 2000) (providing three definitions
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deals, and the fact that Jordan chose not to negotiate for them in his agreement suggests
that the court should be reluctant to rewrite the parties’ bargain to give them to him for
free.
The implication of this goes to disclosure: the more likely it is that the firm can
exclude Jordan from participating in any change-of-control premium, the less valuable
any disclosure would be to him. Given that Jordan had no rights, necessarily, to tag
along, and given that the merger was not a sure thing, the firm would have to tell him
something like, “We are in negotiations for a merger that might or might not happen, and
if it does, you might or might not get bought out at a premium.” This equivocal and
ambiguous statement wouldn’t be of much use to Jordan, and it looks similar to the
comment D&P made when Jordan told the firm he was quitting: “[D&P] said that the
firm had a good potential for growth and that Jordan’s shares would rise in value if he
stayed.”45 Of course, Jordan could ask for details about the merger, but courts generally
bless a “no comment” policy,46 further undercutting the Duff & Phelps court’s move in
the direction of access to equal information.
This argument is analytically the same as Posner’s argument that Jordan’s at-will
status made any potential disclosure worthless to him. As we have seen, the majority
countered Posner’s argument with the claim that firing Jordan to deny him a share of the
merger premium would be “opportunistic”,47 and was thus an untenable basis on which to
deny him disclosure rights. The same might be said of structuring the merger in a way

of “oppression” courts have used in this context: unfair behavior by the majority, violation of fiduciary
duty, and disappointment of the minority’s reasonable expectations). In addition, under certain deal
structures, such as a freeze-out merger, minority shareholders can seek appraisal of the value of their
shares, which generally, and even in Delaware, does not include a minority discount reflecting the lack of a
control premium. See Cavalier Oil Corp v. Harnett, 564 A2d 1137, 1144 (Del 1989) (“The dissenting
shareholder’s proportionate interest is determined only after the company as an entity has been valued. In
that determination the Court of Chancery is not required to apply further weighting factors at the
shareholder level, such as discounts to minority shares for asserted lack of marketability.”) This
asymmetry—majority sellers can sell for a premium but minority shares are not discounted in an appraisal
proceeding—is odd and may not be sensible, but this is a subject for another time.
45
Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 445 (Posner dissenting).
46
See, for example, McCormick v. Fund American Companies, Inc., 26 F3d 869, 884 (9th Cir 1994)
(holding that firms do not have an affirmative obligation to disclose details about merger negotiations to
executive shareholders even when pressed).
47
For an argument that it was Jordan who was acting opportunistically by quitting and then later suing
for a share of the merger consummated after his departure, see id at 450 (Posner dissenting) (“The majority
says that ‘understandably Duff & Phelps did not want a viper in its nest, a disgruntled employee remaining
only in the hope of appreciation of his stock.’ I call that ‘viper’ an opportunist.”).
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that deprived minority shareholders of a control premium, but this is clearly not illegal.
Despite smacking of opportunism, D&P and its merger partner could exclude Jordan
from that which the court tells him he is entitled to receive. It is difficult to see why
Jordan’s employment status should be protected by federal securities laws (i.e., the court
implies that he can’t be fired to make other shareholders better off), when he bargained
for no additional employment rights, and when other rights of the firms and shareholders
involved allow them to take the premium regardless of Jordan’s employment status.
Given the close similarity of this argument to Posner’s at-will argument, it is
somewhat odd that he did not make it. Perhaps he viewed it as too speculative given the
facts as they transpired—the buyer of D&P eventually paid the same price for each and
every share of stock. But it is possible that the buyer did this only because it knew it was
not buying the shares of Jordan and the other employees who quit or were fired around
the same time. We cannot know what the buyer of D&P would have done had it known
of the court’s holding before structuring the transaction, but it is certainly possible that it
would have designed the transaction differently. In any event, this possibility is not
substantively different or more speculative than Posner’s argument that D&P could
theoretically fire Jordan, notwithstanding that it showed no signs of that inclination,
choosing instead to be nice to him as he was leaving.
Furthermore, the transaction-structuring possibility raises the question of what D&P
should have done differently in this case. Given that D&P could have structured Jordan
out of any merger upside, what should D&P have told Jordan? The rule the court
announces mandates that firms tell employee-shareholders about mergers that might
happen, notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing in law or in fact that suggests that
minority shareholders must participate in the fruits of such transactions.
The mischief here should be obvious. Say that D&P, believing that the initial merger
pending with Security Pacific would go through (it did not), told Jordan that he would
participate on a pro rata basis in the merger, and therefore he should stick around.48 If the
deal fell through (which it did), and a subsequent buyer offered to buy only the shares of
a majority of holders, Jordan may have sued for a share of the control premium on

48

Even silence here—“we might merge, which might be good for you”—yields the same result, since
Jordan might reasonably assume from silence as to specifics that he would participate in any premium.
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fraudulent inducement grounds or a theory of promissory estoppel. D&P obviously did
not want to, at the preliminary negotiations stage, lock itself into a particular deal
structure since this would potentially destroy overall shareholder value. In this light, the
choice to be ambiguous seems fairly sensible.
Perhaps more interestingly, the court-mandated obligation to disclose decreases the
flexibility of the firm to make employment decisions at a crucial period in its existence,
something that may make the firm less valuable to any potential acquirer, and therefore
destroy value for shareholders as a group. We might therefore expect shareholders to
agree to permit non-disclosure to bad employees (since it increases overall shareholder
value), and rely on their own performance to keep them valuable to the firm.
To understand this, consider D&P’s options for how to treat each shareholderemployee when faced with a buyout offer. D&P—or, more accurately, the buyer—would
logically want to take along employees whose value to the new firm would exceed the
costs of their continued employment. Importantly, the buyer and seller may have different
views on this. Requiring disclosure to all D&P employees, regardless of whether they
will be valuable to the new firm, and limiting the ability to fire employees in the preconsummation period (what the majority says would be opportunistic conduct), means
that even “bad” employees (from the perspective of the buyer) will be guaranteed to
profit from the merger and to have jobs with the acquirer, for a while at least. In other
words, Jordan might be viewed as a bad employee to the buyer (because he was showing
his disloyalty to the firm by quitting), and would therefore be precisely the type of
employee who a buyer would want to cut out of the deal’s upside, but can’t.49 Duff &
Phelps is wrongheaded insofar as it suggests that firms can’t fire the Jordans of the world
regardless of the employer’s or buyer’s assessment of their value. The rule in effect
freezes employment decisions during this period, and forces buyers that want to deny the
control premium to particular employees to do so through complex deal structuring. The
efficiency of such a forcing rule is highly suspect, and is a consideration the court utterly
ignores.

49

In the several cases that arose from the buyout(s) of D&P, each plaintiff-employee had acted in a way
that showed disloyalty to the firm or that the employee’s value to the firm was very low. See cases cited in
note 28.
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B. Did Jordan Consent to Being Traded against with Superior Information?
One thing upon which Easterbrook and Posner agree is that the parties could, through
contract, waive any duties to disclose; they simply disagree about whether Jordan did so
in this case. This is a pretty remarkable leap, as it seems to run afoul of the ban on waiver
found in both the law of fiduciaries50 and the securities laws.51 It is also the most
noteworthy aspect of the case because it predicts (by about two decades) the Supreme
Court’s analysis in United States v. O’Hagan.52
As a general matter, federal insider-trading law looks to state law for the existence of
a duty to be breached; in the absence of a clear duty—one, for example, founded on a
fiduciary relationship—there can be no liability from the use of material, nonpublic
information. In O’Hagan, the Court held that even when there is such a duty, disclosure
of trading intentions eliminates liability (at least under the misappropriation theory), since
deception is a crucial element of liability that is negated by consent.53
The view that securities laws are waivable (to some extent) by contractual definition
of rights at the state-law level, is more readily accepted after O’Hagan, but when Posner
first suggested it in Duff & Phelps, it was a radical notion. As a normative matter, it is a
perfectly sensible conclusion. Given the benefits of private ordering in business
formation, courts encourage parties to freely contract under state law to arrange the
affairs of closely held firms. If those contracts create specific rights and obligations that
include exceptions to equal treatment or other fiduciary-imposed standards, the federal
laws that piggyback on state law duties should adjust accordingly. As long as the parties
to a face-to-face securities transaction are sophisticated—have access to information, can
ask questions, and don’t otherwise need special protection—there is no reason why they

50

See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L. J.,
879, 887 (“[F]iduciary obligation sometimes operates precisely in opposition to intention as manifest in
express agreements.”) If it is true that majority shareholders owe minority shareholders “fiduciary duties,”
as typically understood in the trust context, these are not waivable. See id at 923 (“A provision in a trust
instrument cannot relieve a trustee of liability for any profit derived from a breach of trust . . ..”) But here
corporate law may be simply sloppy, and “fiduciary duties” might just mean something else—an obligation
to refrain from self-dealing—that may be waived in certain cases.
51
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78cc(a) (2000) (“Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.”).
52
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 US 642, 655 (1997).
53
Id at 653-4.
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should not be able to waive explicit or implicit duties owed to them by the other
transacting party.
A recent court of appeals case is illustrative. In McCormick v. Fund American
Companies, Inc.,54 an executive and large shareholder sold his shares back to the firm
prior to retirement. Before doing so, he asked the firm for specific information related to
pending merger talks but the firm declined and he sold. Later, when the merger came to
pass, he sued under Rule 10b-5, just like Jordan. The court rejected his claim, noting that
the executive’s knowledge of what he didn’t know amounted to a waiver of any claims
that the firm had a duty to disclose.55 This holding butts right up against Duff & Phelps,
in that it would be strange to suggest that a “no comment” policy could insulate a firm
from the Duff & Phelps rule.
The reasoning in McCormick provides the foundation for much over-the-counter
securities practice today, including the use of “big boy” letters, which state that the
parties know that one of them may have more information but since the parties are “big
boys,” they agree to waive any claims arising out of the information asymmetry. Courts
have, by and large, upheld these provisions as enforceable, if not as a claim waiver of any
securities law violations, at least as a nonreliance provision that undercuts any fraud
claim.56
The contract Jordan signed has the spirit of an ex ante waiver or version 1.0 “big boy”
letter. By agreeing to take book value, Jordan was in effect consenting to trades with the
firm at a set price in cases in which one or both parties would know that the fair value of
the shares exceeded book value. Although it was theoretically possible that the shares
would be worth book value (or less) when Jordan left the firm and had to sell them back,
this was an unlikely possibility at the time of contracting, since enterprise value exceeds

54

26 F3d 869 (9th Cir 1994).
See id. at 884 (noting the background knowledge the plaintiff had as a “sophisticated businessman”
who was at the time a former CEO of a subsidiary of the defendant and a current member of the
defendant’s board).
56
See, for example, Harsco Corp v. Segui, 91 F3d 337, 341–48 (2d Cir 1996) (affirming dismissal for
lack of reasonable reliance where sophisticated parties carefully delineated representations that were and
were not made); Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F3d 1073, 1074 (10th Cir 1993) (affirming summary judgment where
defendants advised plaintiffs that nondisclosed information would not be revealed, rendering nondeceptive
their failure to disclose). But see AES Corp v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F3d 174, 180 (3d Cir 2003)
(refusing to hold as a matter of law that nonreliance provisions are sufficient to immunize any Rule 10b-5
claims).
55
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book value in most cases of firms that are not distressed or in bankruptcy.57 This
argument is even more powerful when we consider the standard industry practice of
using the amount paid to purchase the shares, which is often nominal ($0.01), as the
buyout price. In this case, every state of the world in which a buyout happens will involve
informational asymmetries akin to those that the Duff & Phelps court holds give rise to
federal liability.
The only upside of the Duff & Phelps rule is that it might force the parties to bargain
more specifically over disclosure—for example, by using an explicit “big boy” letter—
but this is a costly overlay to what appears to already be a fairly struck bargain, and it
raises overall transaction costs since it allows courts room to intervene in cases where
they find the terms of the bargain or the implementation unfair. Since parties cannot
know these exact contours in advance, the result is more uncertainty and higher
contracting costs.

C. Can There Be “Insider Trading” in Options?
Jordan’s stockholder agreement was an options contract: Jordan sold a call option to
D&P, giving the firm the right to buy his shares at book value at any time; and bought a
put option from D&P, giving him the right to sell his shares at book value at any time.58
In effect, Jordan bought insurance against a decline in firm value (Jordan’s put), while
being able to capitalize on an increase in firm value, subject to his remaining valuable to
and staying with the firm (the firm’s call). Thus, the fundamental legal/policy question in
the case is whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should apply to
these types of options contracts.
Insider-trading law has bite for run-of-the-mill options contracts only at the time of
purchase. In the classic case, a statutory insider who has material, nonpublic information
buys or sells options in order to profit from knowledge that the price of the underlying

57

The average ratio of market value to book value for the largest 7000 firms in the United States in 2006
was over 5, with a median of 2; only distressed or bankrupt firms are the exception. For financial services
firms, like D&P, the average is near 8, with a median of 1.5. Data available at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html (visited February 7, 2007).
58
Posner recognizes this essential feature. See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 447 (Posner dissenting) (“By
signing the stockholder agreement Jordan gave Duff and Phelps in effect an option . . . to buy back his
stock at any time at a fixed price.”).
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stock is going to rise or fall.59 There is no claim in Duff & Phelps that there were
actionable informational asymmetries at the time Jordan signed his shareholder
agreement. If there were such a claim, Duff & Phelps would be easy and uninteresting.
The other relevant time period for options contracts is when the rights granted under
them are executed. But for typical options there can be no liability here because the price
must have already moved to its publicly informed price in order to profit under the
option, and therefore there is no insider trading, just exercising the agreed-to rights. The
only relevant or sensible time to ask whether the holder violated Rule 10b-5 is at the time
the option contract was executed.
Duff & Phelps offers a wrinkle: the option exercise was tied to employment and the
illiquidity makes value more difficult to determine. As a doctrinal matter, the operative
question when employment and shareholding are lumped together is whether
shareholding is incidental to employment or vice versa. The seminal case is Ingle v.
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.,60 where the court held that employment law, in this case an
at-will regime, trumped any obligations arising from share ownership when an employee
was only incidentally a shareholder.61 The policy logic is, as discussed above, that
foundational contracts and parties warrant greater protection than employees brought in
later who are primarily employees and not owners.
Another reason for separation of employee and shareholder rights is the
unworkability of a rule that layers securities fraud on employment decisions like those in
Duff & Phelps. Consider the case of D&P’s CEO, who signed the same contract Jordan
did, and who is contemplating retirement. Inevitably the CEO will have private
information about the true value of the firm: specifically, whether it exceeds, is the same
as, or is less than book value. Under the Duff & Phelps rule, the only time the CEO could
make a retirement choice free from potential civil (or even criminal!) liability is when he
knew that the value was the same as, or not materially different from, book value. (Hint:
never.) Since it would be impossible to make the retirement decision independently from
59

Many of the most famous insider trading cases involve options trading of this kind. See O’Hagan, 521
US at 647–48 (using options to capitalize on nonpublic knowledge of a firm’s client’s planned tender offer
for the Pillsbury Company).
60
73 NY2d 183, 535 NE2d 1311 (1989).
61
Id at 1313 (“A minority shareholder in a close corporation . . . who contractually agrees to the
repurchase of his shares upon termination . . . acquires no right from the corporation . . . against at-will
discharge.”).
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knowledge of firm value, the only choice would be to take the decision away from the
executive, which seems fanciful.
Here is where the Ingle rule has traction: In cases where shareholding is not ancillary
to employment, like in Wilkes, then courts will impose fairness restrictions on how
promoter-shareholders can deal with each other. In cases where employees are merely
given shares as compensation or retention tools of the firm, the courts will force the
parties to contract and will enforce the letter of those contracts.
Firms faced with the Duff & Phelps rule might do one of several things. First, they
might simply give less equity to employees, or they might tie buyouts to some fairly
determined “market” price (which is the same thing). It isn’t clear at all that this is a
desirable policy objective. Second, they might freeze all employment decisions when the
firm is in periods of uncertain future value. This, of course, is not only hugely inefficient,
but also impossible to implement—how would a firm forbid an employee from quitting?
It seems far better to require firms to follow a general rule—like the price-and-structure
rule—and refrain from actively misleading employee-shareholders. This preserves
freedom of contract at the agreement and employment decision time. Some employees
will win, by timing exit decisions well, and others, like Jordan, will lose. But this
eventuality should be apparent at the time the parties write the contract, and if individual
employees want greater protection, they can bargain for it.

IV. CONCLUSION
In Duff & Phelps, Posner is at his best and perhaps at his worst. His reasoning
eclipses the narrow issues presented by the facts, making compelling arguments about a
range of issues that courts would not otherwise come around to, if at all, for decades. His
style is breezy, witty, and draws on a range of legal materials and types of thinking.
When you read the opinion, you think how fun it would be to be his colleague or clerk—
although not necessarily one of the litigants. The downside is that his analytical and
doctrinal innovations propel the court into a holding that eats up more legal space than it
needs to, and creates a set of unneeded and nettlesome duties that make corporate law
less clear and certain.
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On the merits, Jordan’s contract, which was the same as every employee-shareholder,
would not be fundamentally frustrated by the lack of an implied term—as in the salesman
commission cases. The courts should be less confident about reading in contractual terms
since Jordan did bargain, unlike in Wilkes, and was primarily an employee, as opposed to
a founder-shareholder. Although Duff & Phelps is still good law, subsequent cases, like
Gallagher, have carved back on its reach. Posner’s genius was to see the path of the law
in advance of its march. His dissent, although cited in a nontrivial number of cases, did
not provide the explicit intellectual or doctrinal foundation of any of these cases, but his
reasoning can be said to have predicted their results.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor M. Todd Henderson
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
toddh@uchicago.edu

23

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–200 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)
David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law (April 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication (February 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of Statistical
Lives (February 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage; A Critique of the Institute of
Medicine Study (March 2004)
Richard A. Epstein and Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady
the Course on Hatch-Waxman (March 2004)
Richard A. Esptein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (April 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute (May 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor within
and between Law Firms (April 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge:
Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry (April 2004)
James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for Underwriting
Business (July 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004)
Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (July 2004)
Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, and Cass R. Sunstein, Company Stock, Market
Rationality, and Legal Reform (July 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets (August 2004,
revised October 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions
(August 2004)
M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks (August 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Cyber Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry
Barriers? (September 2004)
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law (September 2004)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law (2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment (October 2004)
Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO (October 2004)
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (November 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (December 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy
(February 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies (March
2005)
Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts (March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life
Tradeoffs (March 2005)
Alan O. Sykes, Trade Remedy Laws (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home, and the Duty of Ongoing Design
(March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)
James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response (May 2005)

24

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Douglas Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism (May 2005)
Douglas G. Baird, Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of INS v. AP (May 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance
(May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities (July 2005)
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income
Tax (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Intergenerational Equity (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: A Consumer’s Guide (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005)
David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting (August 2005)
Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization
Bargain (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)
Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is Democracy (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Climate Change
(November 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is (November 2005,
revised January 2006)
Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe
Neighborhoods in Chicago (November 2005)
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets
(December 2005)
Kenneth W. Dam, Institutions, History, and Economics Development (January 2006, revised October 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Land, Law and Economic Development (January 2006, revised October 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply (January 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth (January 2006,
revised October 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism (January 2006, revised August 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population Rates in Empirical
Research on the Relationship between Incarceration and Crime, Unemployment, Poverty, and Other Social
Indicators? On the Continuity of Spatial Exclusion and Confinement in Twentieth Century United States
(January 2006)
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (January 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility under
International Law (February 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Equity Markets, The Corporation and Economic Development (February 2006, revised
October 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Credit Markets, Creditors’ Rights and Economic Development (February 2006)
Douglas G. Lichtman, Defusing DRM (February 2006)
Jeff Leslie and Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights without Controversy (March 2006)
Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery (March 2006)
Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” (March
2006)
Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers (March 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development (March 2006, revised October 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt: Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial Profiling an Effective Counterterrorist Measure
and Does It Violate the Right to Be Free from Discrimination? (March 2006)
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias (April 2006)

25

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Lior J. Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?) (April 2006)
Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management (April 2006)
Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process (May 2006)
Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule (June 2006)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron (June 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change (June 2006)
Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation (June 2006)
David A. Weisbach, Implementing Income and Consumption Taxes: An Essay in Honor of David Bradford
(June 2006)
David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Reid Hastie, What Happened on Deliberation Day? (June 2006)
David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principle Agent Problems, and Redundancy (June 2006)
Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006)
Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols (August 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006)
Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (September 2006)
Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006)
M. Todd Henderson, Payiing CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs Are Low
(September 2006)
Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance (September
2006)
Randal C. Picker, Who Should Regulate Entry into IPTV and Municipal Wireless? (September 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September 2006)
David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006)
Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (October 2006)
Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?
(November 2006)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law (November 2006)
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth without Markets? (November 2006)
Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor
Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (December 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (December 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and Commutations
(January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to Habermas)
(January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Completely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007)
Albert H. Choi and Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (January 2007)
Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007)
Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation,
Balancing and Stigmatic Harms (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007)
David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and Doctrine in the
Corporate Tax (January 2007)
Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comments on “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design” (January 2007)
Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal (January
2007)
Randal C. Picker, Pulling a Rabbi Out of His Hat: The Bankruptcy Magic of Dick Posner (February 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic (Libertarian) Authoritarian
(February 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? (February 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For (March 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution. Part II: State
Level Analysis (March 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act (March 2007)

26

338.

M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps (March 2007)

27

